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How to use the Cypherpunks Remailers
------------------------------------
by Hal Finney, <74076.1041@compuserve.com>
First written: January 10, 1993
Last revised: May 29, 1993
Several sites are running simple remailers based on Perl scripts
originally created by Eric Hughes and using the mh utility program
"slocal". I wrote a simple slocal replacement in Perl, and added
PGP decryption. The code for these remailers is available by
anonymous ftp from soda.berkeley.edu, in the cypherpunks/remailer
directory. The latest version of this document may be found there as
well, as long as other scripts useful in operating the remailers.
At the bottom of this document is a list of currently available Cypherpunks
remailers.
These basic remailers have one main function: they will automatically
forward a message to any requested destination, removing all incoming
header fields except "Subject:". Although this is less power than
some other remailers provide, the Cypherpunks remailers do not require
the operator to have root privileges on the machine which runs the
remailer. It basically has to be a Unix machine which runs Perl and
which supports the feature of looking for a ".forward" file in the
user's home directory to find the name of a program for processing
incoming mail. Many Unix systems provide these capabilities.
Basic Remailing Functions
-------------------------
There are two general ways of specifying the remailing instructions.
The simplest is to add an extra field to the header of the message.
All of the Cypherpunks remailers will accept the field name
"Request-Remailing-To:". (Several of the remailers also accept shorter
versions of this name, but there is no standard for the short versions
accepted.) Simply put the address that you want the mail to be forwarded
to after "Request-Remailing-To:" in the message header, and the forwarding
will be done. (Case is important in this header field, so be sure to put
in the capital letters as shown.)
The remailers do not create aliases or allow replies to such anonymously
forwarded mail. (But see below for how anonymous replies can be
done using the encryption enhancements.)
Here is an example:
================================================================
Date: Tue, 1 Dec 92 22:13:57 -0800
Message-Id: <9301100613.AA05323@soda.berkeley.edu>
From: "Sue Jones" <sue@mec.com>
To: hfinney@shell.portal.com
Subject: Anonymous mail
Request-Remailing-To: joe@tap.com
Joe - This is some anonymous mail from me.
================================================================
This is a message from sue@mec.com to be anonymously forwarded to
joe@tap.com. It is directed to the Cypherpunks remailer at address
hfinney@shell.portal.com. When Joe receives the message it will look
something like:
================================================================
Sender: hfinney@shell.portal.com
Date: Wed, 2 Dec 92 01:03:31 -0800
Message-Id: <9301110702.AA15971@shell.portal.com>
To: joe@tap.com
From: nobody@shell.portal.com
Subject: Anonymous mail
Remailed-By: Hal Finney <hfinney@shell.portal.com>
Joe - This is some anonymous mail from me.
================================================================
All the identifying information from Sue's message header has been
replaced, except for the subject line.
Many people have mailers which will not allow them to add fields to the
headers of the messages they send. Instead, they can only put material
into the bodies of the mail. In order to accomodate such systems, the
Cypherpunks remailers provide a mechanism for "pasting" the first few
lines of the message body into the header. These lines can then contain
"Request-Remailing-To:" commands.
This is done by having the first non-blank line of your message be the
special token "::" (two colons). If the Cypherpunks remailers see this
as the first non-blank line, all following lines up to a blank one
will be pasted into your mail header. Then the message will be processed
as usual. Here is how the message above would be prepared if Sue were
not able to add lines to her outgoing message header.
================================================================
Date: Tue, 1 Dec 92 22:13:57 -0800
Message-Id: <9301100613.AA05323@soda.berkeley.edu>
From: "Sue Jones" <sue@mec.com>
To: hfinney@shell.portal.com
Subject: Anonymous mail
::
Request-Remailing-To: joe@tap.com
Joe - This is some anonymous mail from me.
================================================================
There are three common mistakes which I have seen in messages using
these remailers. The first is to leave the "::" off. Sometimes people
are not sure whether the text they write goes into the header or the
message body. They may think they are putting it into the header, but
it is actually in the body. The "::" is needed if it will be in the
body. The second mistake is leaving off the blank line after the
material to be added to the header. In that case the whole message gets
added to the header (up to the first blank in the message), causing
considerable confusion for the remailer and generally not allowing
the mail to be forwarded. The third mistake is to misspell
"Request-Remailing-To:".
Anonymous Posting
-----------------
Although the only remailer function is to forward messages to someone,
they can also be used (indirectly) for anonymous posting. This can
be done by mailing to one of the mail-to-news gateways offered at a
few sites. These gateway computers will automatically post any message
they receive with a special address format. A commonly used format is to
take the newsgroup name and replace "." with "-", then add the address
of the gateway after an "@" sign.
These gateways tend not to have a very long lifetime, but at least at
this writing one operates at cs.utexas.edu. Another operates at
ucbvax.berkeley.edu, but that one is only available for mail from
Berkeley sites. Fortunately, there are cypherpunks remailers operating
>from Berkeley sites (see the list below). By using one of those remailers
to direct the mail to ucbvax.berkeley.edu, it should be possible to post
to news.
As an example, to post to sci.crypt, send mail to "sci-crypt@cs.utexas.edu",
or use one of the Berkeley cypherpunks remailers to send mail to
"sci-crypt@ucbvax.berkeley.edu". By using remailers in conjunction with
mail-to-news gateways, anonymous posting is possible. Realize, though,
that people will not be able to respond to you directly (but see below
for the anonymous address implementation).
(Sometimes people ask how to post to groups with "-" in their names,
since these gateways turn "-" characters into "."'s. I don't know the answer
but if anyone finds out please tell me and I will incorporate it into a
future version of this document.)
Chaining Remailers
------------------
Remailers can be chained for somewhat more security. The simplest way
to do this is to put multiple blocks starting with :: and ending with
a blank line at the beginning of the message. Here is the example above,
re-done to pass through two remailers, first hh@soda.berkeley.edu, then
hfinney@shell.portal.com.
================================================================
Date: Tue, 1 Dec 92 22:13:57 -0800
Message-Id: <9301100613.AA05323@soda.berkeley.edu>
From: "Sue Jones" <sue@mec.com>
To: hh@soda.berkeley.edu
Subject: Anonymous mail
::
Request-Remailing-To: hfinney@shell.portal.com
::
Request-Remailing-To: joe@tap.com
Joe - This is some anonymous mail from me.
================================================================
This mail is sent to the remailer at hh@soda.berkeley.edu. It will strip
off the first "::" and the "Request-Remailing-To: hfinney@shell.portal.com"
lines, and send it to the "shell.portal.com" remailer. That remailer will
then send the message to Joe. Chains can be made as long as desired by
extending this scheme.
Chaining does increase the complexity of the path a message takes,
but the gain in security is limited because the whole path is visible
in the message when you send it. Adding encryption to the remailer
allows more security, especially when combined with chaining.
Encrypting Enhancements
-----------------------
Encryption/decryption for the Cypherpunks remailers is done using
Phillip Zimmermann's "underground" public-key encryption program,
PGP. Although PGP's legality for use in the U.S. is debatable (and
often debated), it is widely available at overseas ftp sites and at
some domestic sites. Use "archie" or a similar service to find the
latest version.
The encryption enhancement to the remailers is done in a fairly simple
way. Each remailer which supports this enhancement has a PGP public
key which is made public. (PGP keys for current Cypherpunks
remailers are listed at the bottom of this document.) Any message
in the above formats can be encrypted with the PGP key of a remailer,
and sent to that remailer. To show that it is a PGP message, the
mail header must have the line "Encrypted: PGP" added to it.
Upon receipt of a message with such a header line, the remailers will
attempt to decrypt the incoming message using their PGP secret key.
The result of the decryption is then subject to the same processing
steps described above.
Here is an example of the use of this system. We start with the
second example above. I will just show the message body as the
sender composes it:
================================================================
::
Request-Remailing-To: joe@tap.com
Joe - This is some anonymous mail from me.
================================================================
This is the body of the message which Sue is sending, anonymously,
to Joe. It has the "::" and "Request-Remailing-To:" lines, followed
by a blank, then the text to be sent to Joe.
Sue would then encrypt this file using PGP, with the "-a" switch for
Ascii output, using the public key of the remailer. This would
yield something like:
================================================================
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Version: 2.2
hEwCG6rHcT8LtDcBAf4rGrBciM/mJhDRkjvIhOlUaUI2MgW6GNvyxkPVc0FM34RR
MWTU+TdhGARMWoghyYi96/p0+PrBceLviahMdj/9pgAAAHE/mXUHdmuWjcQeeBuP
NsbajDo1ygxk/0WM2AEXZzzGSTTP9fW5wVi52QxVv3ok7S3dNlX+kUDiUCxBjSdf
UfnoHo5/ng0jVdQgNA39toaHOpEMEUc+JCQXuXwTJ+OfuVssCFnUWYX2kYddgNrE
4qvm3w==
=xsVd
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
================================================================
This is a typical PGP output file. Now, this is the file that Sue
would send to the remailer. But first she needs to mark it with the
"Encrypted: PGP" header line. Using the "::" pasting operator, she
would edit this output file, adding the required header, to produce:
================================================================
::
Encrypted: PGP
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Version: 2.2
hEwCG6rHcT8LtDcBAf4rGrBciM/mJhDRkjvIhOlUaUI2MgW6GNvyxkPVc0FM34RR
MWTU+TdhGARMWoghyYi96/p0+PrBceLviahMdj/9pgAAAHE/mXUHdmuWjcQeeBuP
NsbajDo1ygxk/0WM2AEXZzzGSTTP9fW5wVi52QxVv3ok7S3dNlX+kUDiUCxBjSdf
UfnoHo5/ng0jVdQgNA39toaHOpEMEUc+JCQXuXwTJ+OfuVssCFnUWYX2kYddgNrE
4qvm3w==
=xsVd
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
================================================================
This is what she would send to hfinney@shell.portal.com. Note that
this file does not reveal the true destination of Sue's message. Only
when the remailer decrypts the file will it see to whom to send it.
As with ordinary remailing commands, certain mistakes are more common.
The most frequent is to forget the "Encrypted: PGP" header line,
which must be either in the message header itself, or be put there
with the "::" pasting token as in the example above. Another common
mistake is to forget the "::" within the encrypted message itself,
or to forget the blank line after the "Request-Remailing-To" line
within the encrypted text.
Chaining Encrypted Messages
---------------------------
Chaining encrypted messages is basically a matter of repeating the
encrypting steps. For example, suppose Sue wanted to chain two remailers,
first going through elee7h5@rosebud.ee.uh.edu, then through
hfinney@shell.portal.com. She has to first encrypt it for the second
remailer in the chain, then encrypt the resulting output for the
first remailer. That way, when she sends the message, each remailer
will decrypt one "layer" of the message, revealing the hidden message
for the next one in the chain.
(Think of the "nested envelope" model. Encrypting a message is like
putting it into an envelope that only a certain remailer can open.
Chaining remailers is like sealing one envelope inside another. To send
a letter through two remailers, you would first seal it inside the envelope
of the second remailer, then seal that one inside the envelope of the
first remailer.)
In this example, Sue would take the output just above, which is the
message for the hfinney@shell.portal.com remailer, and add remailing
instructions to get it sent to that remailer:
================================================================
::
Request-Remailing-To: hfinney@shell.portal.com
::
Encrypted: PGP
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Version: 2.2
hEwCG6rHcT8LtDcBAf4rGrBciM/mJhDRkjvIhOlUaUI2MgW6GNvyxkPVc0FM34RR
MWTU+TdhGARMWoghyYi96/p0+PrBceLviahMdj/9pgAAAHE/mXUHdmuWjcQeeBuP
NsbajDo1ygxk/0WM2AEXZzzGSTTP9fW5wVi52QxVv3ok7S3dNlX+kUDiUCxBjSdf
UfnoHo5/ng0jVdQgNA39toaHOpEMEUc+JCQXuXwTJ+OfuVssCFnUWYX2kYddgNrE
4qvm3w==
=xsVd
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
================================================================
This is going to be sent to the "rosebud" remailer, so she encrypts this
file with that remailer's public key. The result would be like this:
================================================================
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Version: 2.2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=rbpv
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
================================================================
Now, she will need to mark this message with the "Encrypted: PGP"
header:
================================================================
::
Encrypted: PGP
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Version: 2.2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=rbpv
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
================================================================
This message is what would actually be sent to elee7h5@rosebud.ee.uh.edu.
It would decrypt it and send the inner encrypted message on to
hfinney@shell.portal.com, which would decrypt its input and finally get
the cleartext message which Sue is sending to Joe.
Using chained encryption conceals the fact that Sue is communicating
with Joe from all participants (except Sue). The first remailer
sees a message from Sue, which it decrypts, but it doesn't know
who the final recipient is. The second remailer sees that the message
is going to Joe, after decrypting it, but it doesn't know who originally
sent it. No one is in a position to pair up Sue with Joe.
Creating these chained messages is tedious if done by hand. There
have been some Unix shell scripts posted on the Cypherpunks list which
help automate the process. These are available by anonymous ftp from
the Cypherpunks list site, soda.berkeley.edu. They make it quite easy
to send chained encrypted messages.
Anonymous Addresses
-------------------
The encrypted remailers allow an interesting form of an anonymous
address. An anonymous address is an address which allows someone to
send you mail without knowing who you really are or your true email
address. Some remailers implement this by creating aliases or
pseudonyms for each user, and keeping a table which allows them to
look up a given alias and find out who the user is that it belongs
to. The simple Cypherpunks remailers don't keep any kind of table
information, so it is necessary to embed all of the necessary
information in the anonymous address itself.
The simplest form of an anonymous address is a "Request-Remailing-To"
block, encrypted with the PGP key of a remailer. In the examples
above, suppose Sue wanted to supply Joe with a way of reaching her,
without revealing her address. The first step in creating such an
anonymous address would be for her to create a file which held:
================================================================
::
Request-Remailing-To: sue@mec.com
================================================================
This is just the same as the kind of remailing request blocks which
would be put at the front of a message for an ordinary use of the
remailers. Note the "::" token as the first line, and the blank
line which comes after the "Request-Remailing-To:". Sue puts her own
real email address on the "Request-Remailing-To:" line.
Now, she can't send this to Joe or he'd see her email address. What
she does instead is to encrypt it with the public key of the remailer
she wants to use for the anonymous address forwarding. Suppose it
is hfinney@shell.portal.com. This would produce:
================================================================
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Version: 2.2
hEwCG6rHcT8LtDcBAf0R3rsCl1z0K3VI8bGTa0b/4MQdh3VAhNd+PIDkncwcHhk1
1w4p6FST92QURYxyXXW4FVqSuJL0KepPKgXh+36kpgAAAEyHhcro57nKPUqC9/xn
TLIoqX5CXBiKPp32fmSUyrgJf+thg9oTviReiMa/vvhtoher4nmBRSgcUBmJPOEX
/ri9dIm4kMKc95R6p3at
=0C8o
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
================================================================
Now, to make it so that the remailer will know to process it with PGP,
Sue must add the "Encrypted: PGP" header line to the beginning using
the "::" pasting token:
================================================================
::
Encrypted: PGP
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Version: 2.2
hEwCG6rHcT8LtDcBAf0R3rsCl1z0K3VI8bGTa0b/4MQdh3VAhNd+PIDkncwcHhk1
1w4p6FST92QURYxyXXW4FVqSuJL0KepPKgXh+36kpgAAAEyHhcro57nKPUqC9/xn
TLIoqX5CXBiKPp32fmSUyrgJf+thg9oTviReiMa/vvhtoher4nmBRSgcUBmJPOEX
/ri9dIm4kMKc95R6p3at
=0C8o
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
================================================================
The resulting file can be used as Sue's anonymous address. Here is
how she would use it. She would include it in her message to Bob,
with a comment like:
================================================================
Bob - If you want to reply to me, just take the block of text below,
starting at the "::" line, and put it at the front of the message
you want to send to me. Then send the whole thing to
hfinney@shell.portal.com. That remailer will forward your message to me.
Here is the block of text to use:
::
Encrypted: PGP
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Version: 2.2
hEwCG6rHcT8LtDcBAf0R3rsCl1z0K3VI8bGTa0b/4MQdh3VAhNd+PIDkncwcHhk1
1w4p6FST92QURYxyXXW4FVqSuJL0KepPKgXh+36kpgAAAEyHhcro57nKPUqC9/xn
TLIoqX5CXBiKPp32fmSUyrgJf+thg9oTviReiMa/vvhtoher4nmBRSgcUBmJPOEX
/ri9dIm4kMKc95R6p3at
=0C8o
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
================================================================
Bob, if he follows these directions, will put that block of text at
the beginning of his message, followed by what he wants to send to
Sue. This will produce something like:
================================================================
::
Encrypted: PGP
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Version: 2.2
hEwCG6rHcT8LtDcBAf0R3rsCl1z0K3VI8bGTa0b/4MQdh3VAhNd+PIDkncwcHhk1
1w4p6FST92QURYxyXXW4FVqSuJL0KepPKgXh+36kpgAAAEyHhcro57nKPUqC9/xn
TLIoqX5CXBiKPp32fmSUyrgJf+thg9oTviReiMa/vvhtoher4nmBRSgcUBmJPOEX
/ri9dIm4kMKc95R6p3at
=0C8o
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
Hi - I don't know who you are, but I am interested in hearing more
about you. Signed, Bob.
================================================================
He would send this to hfinney@shell.portal.com. That remailer would
see the "Encrypted: PGP" header line after processing the "::" pasting
token, and decrypt the PGP message. This would produce:
================================================================
::
Request-Remailing-To: sue@mec.com
Hi - I don't know who you are, but I am interested in hearing more
about you. Signed, Bob.
================================================================
This would then be operated on in the usual way, causing the message
to be forwarded to Sue. This is how Sue's anonymous address could
allow Bob to send to her without knowing who she is, and without the
remailer having to keep any lists of aliases or pseudonyms.
An extension of this scheme will allow Sue to create an anonymous
address which chains through two or more remailers. She has to
repeatedly encrypt them, just as when setting up a chained remailing
sequence. This procedure can be cumbersome, but scripts should soon
be available to automate the process.
The anonymous addresses provided by the Cypherpunks remailers are
not nearly as easy to use as the automatic aliases maintained by
some of the other remailers. They do not support the automatic insertion
of the anonymous address when the recipient uses the "reply" function
of his mail program. He has to manually copy this rather large block
of text to the front of his message. Perhaps in the future it will
be possible to embed anonymous addresses of this kind in a specially
labelled header field, and to teach remailers to use such addresses
for replying if they exist.
The anonymous addresses are also rather lengthy in this form, so
again the pseudonym-based addresses may be the more practical way to
go. It is interesting, though, to see that very simple remailing
software can provide rather advanced functionality.
Current Cypherpunks Remailers
-----------------------------
All of the following remailers accept the basic "Request-Remailing-To"
remailing request:
hh@pmantis.berkeley.edu
hh@cicada.berkeley.edu
hh@soda.berkeley.edu
The following remailers also accept the "Encrypted: PGP" function.
The public keys for all of the remailers (plus the special one mentioned
below) are in the keyring file below. They can all be used for
anonymous addresses as described above.
phantom@mead.u.washington.edu
hal@alumni.caltech.edu
remailer@rebma.mn.org
elee7h5@rosebud.ee.uh.edu
hfinney@shell.portal.com
The next remailer is a variant on the Cypherpunks remailers. It will
work _only_ with encrypted messages, using its public key (in the keyring
file below). But it allows a simpler syntax. It is not necessary to
put "Encrypted: PGP" into the message header. In addition, the "::" pasting
operator is assumed, so you can leave that off. Also, instead of
"Request-Remailing-To:" you can say just "To:". So messages are much
simpler in format for this remailer. Using our example above, Sue need
only encrypt a file consisting of:
================================================================
To: joe@tap.com
Joe - This is some anonymous mail from me.
================================================================
She would encrypt this using the public key of the remailer below, and
send the resulting PGP output directly to that remailer.
Presently, this special remailer does not support anonymous addresses.
The remailer address is:
remail@extropia.wimsey.com
Here is a PGP keyring file containing keys for the encryption based
remailers listed here:
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.2e
mQCNAitcsHIAAAEEAPZ3Ex1rEwKLeANRoaRyTA72htDFGiGPmWkowByZyUtRkTRp
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Summary
-------
Although these remailers are not as fully featured as some of the
alias-based anonymous remailers in use, they do provide useful capabilities
and they are designed to be run by ordinary users on a wide class of
Unix based computers. It is hoped that future enhancements to these
remailers will make it possible for almost everyone to run remailers
routinely as part of the general culture of email users. Such a system
could provide real privacy in the use of electronic mail.